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[Crim. No. 5643. In Bank. Apr. 8, 1955.1 
In re WARREN E. BARTGES, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Evidenc&-3'udicial Notice-Laws of Sister States.-In view 
of requirement of Code Civ. Pro c., § 1875, subd. 3, that judicial 
notice be taken of statutory definition of crime in sister state, 
it is mistake for appellate court to state that, there being no 
evidence to contrary, it will be assumed that law with respect 
to crimes charged as prior convictions in sister states is same 
as it is in California. 
[i] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Excess of Jurisdiction.-
Petitioner's contention on habeas corpus that judgments against 
him in consolidated criminal cases were incorrect and beyond 
power of superior court to make (and District Court of Appeal 
to affirm) in determining that two of three prior convictions 
(the charges of which had been dismissed) are true, is 
moot where, after filing of petition for habeas corpus, 
District Court of Appeal recalled its remittitur and modified 
trial court's jUdgments so as to recite only one prior convic-
tion, and sheriff then filed supplemental return which shows 
that petitioner is held under modified c.bstra(!t of judgments 
which show only one prior conviction, since he has secured 
relief in that respect to which he was entitled. 
(Sl Oriminal Law-Habitual 01fenders-Review.-Where defend-
ant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms on two primary 
counts of which he was found guilty, but court incorrectly 
found that defendant suffered three alleged prior convictions, 
the charges of two of which had been dismissed and were un-
supported by proof, it cannot be said on habeas corpus that 
trial court's unwarranted determination as to number of prior 
eonvictions did not influence it in sentencing defendant to 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 27 i Am.Jur., Evidence, § 47. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 37; [2] Habeas Corpus, 
19; [3] Criminal Law, § H59; [4] Criminal Law, §§ 998, 1485; 
(6} Habeas Corpua, § 2; (6, 7] Habeas Corpus, § 6S. 
D 
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consecutive rather than concurrent terms, especially where 
District Court of Appeal on affirming jUdgments of conviction 
specifically relied on mistaken assumption that defendant was 
shown to have been convicted of at least three prior felonies. 
[4] ld.-Probation-Review: Punishment-Concurrent and Cumu-
lative Sentences.-Where District Court of Appeal has modified 
consecutive sentence judgmcnts in two consolidated criminal 
cases by striking out findings of two prior convictions, de-
fendant's right to have trial court determine on corrected 
record whether probation shall be granted or denied and 
whether sentences, if reimposed, shall run cumulatively or 
concurrently is substantial one, and inasmuch as statutes 
(Pen. Code, §§ 669, 1203; see also Pen. Code, §§ 1213, 1213.5, 
3021, 3024, 3024.5, 3043) vest power to make such determina-
tions in trial court, District Court of Appeal as reviewing 
court does not have power to determine on changed record 
whether probation shall be granted or denied and whether 
sentences shall run concurrently or cumulatively, but must 
remand cause to trial court for such determinations and ap-
propriate proceedings. 
[5] Habeas Corpus-Function of Writ.-Function of writ of 
habeas corpus is solely to effect "discharge" from unlawful 
restraint, though illegality in respect to which discharge from 
restraint is sought may not go to fact of continued detention 
but may be simply as to circumstances under which prisoner 
is held. 
[6] ld. - Judgment - Discharge.-A prisoner may be discharged 
from illegal conditions of restraint although not from all re-
straint. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1484, 1493.) 
[7] ld.-Judgment-Discharge.-A writ of habeas corpus may be 
granted, not to discharge petitioner from custody of sheriff 
but to discharge him only from illegal circumstances of his 
restraint and to order his production before superior court 
80 that he may be dealt with according to law as person 
properly convicted of, but not yet properly sentenced for, 
substantive crimes charged in informations and only one of 
three alleged prior convictions, after modification of judgment 
by District Court of Appeal. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted, not to discharge petitioner from 
custody of sheriff, but to discharge him from illegal circum-
stances of his restraint and to order his production before 
superior court so that he may properly be dealt with accord-
ing to law. 
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Lowell Lyons for Petitioner. 
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S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Jere J. 
Sullivan and Robert Wheeler, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this habeas corpus proceeding the ulti-
mate que~tion is whether the District Court of Appeal, after 
modifying consecutive sentence judgments in two consolidated 
criminal cases by striking out findings of two prior convictions, 
has power to itself implicitly determine upon the changed 
record whether probation shall be granted or denied and 
whether the sentences shall run cumulatively or concurrently, 
or must remand the cause to the trial court for such deter-
minations and appropriate proceedings. We conclude that 
petitioner is entitled to the writ, not to be discharged from 
custody of the sheriff but to be produced in the superior 
court for proceedings appropriate to the state of the record 
as hereinafter explained. 
Petitioner was convicted of one count of grand theft and 
one count of forgery and it was found that he had suffered 
three prior convictions of felony. Probation was denied; the 
judgments which were thereupon entered recited the three 
prior convictions and ordered that the sentences run con· 
secutively. Defendant appealed and the District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the judgments in People v. Bartges (1954), 
126 Cal.App.2d 763, 776 [273 P.2d 49], holding in substance, 
tnter alia, that "Since appellant was shown to have been 
l!onvicted of at least three prior felonies" it could not be 
said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
probation and in ordering that the sentences run consecu-
tively. There was no petition for rehearing or for a hearing 
in this court, and the judgment of the District Court of 
Appeal became final. 
After petitioner had filed the petition for habeas corpus 
which is now before this court, the District Court of Appeal 
recalled its remittitur and modified the trial court's judg-
ments to recite only one prior conviction. However, it did 
not remand the cause for determination by the trial court 
as to whether upon the changed record probation should be 
granted or denied, and whether, if reimposed, the sentences 
should run concurrently or consecutively, and for resentenc-
ing, if and as appropriate. Instead, the District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the judgments as modified by it. (People v. 
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Petitioner (subject to bail as fixed by the superior court) 
is in the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County and 
stay of execution has been granted by the superior court 
"to the time when the application to the State Supreme Court 
has been determined and to the time within which an appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court may be perfected." 
Petitioner complains that the trial court's determination 
that his sentences should run consecutively rather than con-
currently was based on its mistaken belief as to the number 
of prior convictions which he has suffered. The record 
supports this contention to the extent and for the reasons 
hereinafter stated. Petitioner further contends that the trial 
court violated due process by upholding the refusal of a 
witness, called by petitioner, to testify on the ground tllat 
he might incriminate himself (U.S. Const., Amendment V; 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 2065). This 
contention was correctly disposed of on petitioner's appeal 
from the judgments of conviction (People v. Bartges (1954), 
supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 763). 
The judgments of conviction recited that "the Court • • • 
found allegations of prior convictions ... true, to-wit: 
Arson, a felony [in Oregon in 1932] •.. ; Larceny and Lar-
eeny by Bailee, felonies [in Oregon in 1941], ... Grand 
Theft, a felony [in Arizona in 1949]," with service of terms 
in the respective state prisons. Before the District Court 
of Appeal petitioner contended, among otller things, tllat 
two of tile prior convictions were not proved. As petitioner 
points out, although exemplified copies of the Oregon convic-
tion of larceny and larceny by bailee and of the Arizona 
conviction of grand theft were produced by the prosecuting 
attorney and numbered for identification, such copies were 
not offered or received in evidence; instead, tile prosecuting 
attorney moved "to dismiss the second and third prior con-
victions as alleged in tile information" and the trial court 
granted the motion. The District Court of Appeal, perhaps 
misled by the fact that the index to the reporter's transcript 
mistakenly show~ that such ex('mplificd copics were in evidence, 
and not having had its attention directed to the fact of dis-
missal, and presuming the judgments to be correct, rejected 
the contention of petitioner that the prior convictions had 
not been established (pp. 774-776 of 126 Cal.App.2d). 
The reason for the prosecuting attorney's not offering 
evidence of the two prior convictions, and for moving to 
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dismiss the charges, was stated by him at the trial. He 
seems to have been of the opinion that the prior convictions 
should not be charged and proved because they were adju-
dications that the defendant had committed acts which, had 
they been committed in California, would not have amounted 
to grand theft as defined by the law of this state (theft of 
money or property of a value exceeding $200 [Pen. Code, 
§ 487] ). This appears from the statement of the prosecuting 
attorney that "I understand now that the dividing line 
between petty theft and grand theft in Arizona is $50.00 
and in Oregon the dividing line is $35.00, so although those 
would stand as felony convictions in the other States, they 
would not be felony convictions in California." [1] AI-
thougn this court, as required by statute since 1927 (Stats. 
1927, p. 110; Code Civ. Proc., § 1875, subd. 3), takes judicial 
notice of the statutory definition of a crime in a sister state 
(see In re McVickers (1946), 29 Cal.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 
40] ), the District Court of Appeal did not judicially notice 
the Oregon and Arizona statutory delineations between grand 
and petty theft referred to in the quoted statement of'the 
prosecuting attorney; it mistakenly said (p. 775 of 126 Cal. 
App.2d), "There being no evidence to the contrary, it will 
be assumed that the law with respect to the crimes charged 
as prior convictions in the sister states is the same as it is 
in California." 
After the decision of the District Court of Appeal became 
final petitioner filed the petition for habeas corpus which 
is now before us. He contends, in effect, that the superior 
court exceeded its jurisdiction in finding him guilty of two 
prior convictions the charges of which had been dismissed 
and which were not supported by proof, and that the District 
Court of Appeal likewise exceeded its jurisdiction in affirm-
ing those judgments. He points to the District Court's hold-
ings that" Since appellant was shown to have been convicted 
of Lt least three prior felonies it cannot be said that in 
imposing consecutive sentences herein the court was im-
properly influenced to the prejudice of appellant by the 
prior conviction of larceny by bailee in the State of Oregon," 
and that "we cannot say that the denial of probation under 
such circumstances, amounted to an abuse of discretion" 
(p. 776 of 126 Cal.App.2d). This court issued an order to 
show cause, and the sheriff filed his return. 
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of Appeal of an entry in the clerk's transcript on appeal 
which apparently had not been previously directed to the 
attention of that court by either party to the appeal. Such 
entry shows that during the trial "Motion of the District 
Attorney to dismiss the second and third prior convictions 
as alleged in the information is granted." The District Court 
of Appeal (People v. Bartges (1954), supra, 128 Cal.App.2d 
496, 498) determined that "A mistake of fact on the part of 
an appellate tribunal which results in prejudicial error or a 
miscarriage of justice affords a proper ground for recall and 
correction of the remittitur [citations] ... Since the motion 
to dismiss the last two prior convictions was granted by the 
trial court and was not brought to the attention of this court 
prior to rendition of its decision affirming the judgments 
containing a finding that all three priors charged were true, 
we are persuaded that such decision being inadvertently 
rendered under a mistake of fact entitles us to take such 
steps as are necessary to bring into agreement the facts and 
the law." 
The District Court of Appeal recalled its remittitur. It 
noted the fact that petitioner urged "that the improper 
finding of three prior convictions resulted in improper im-
position of consecutive sentences" and modified its original 
order of full affirmance to provide that "The judgments 
are modified by striking therefrom the finding of the truth 
of the second and third prior conviction r sic]," but, as here-
inabove indicated, instead of thereupon reversing the judg-
ments and remanding the cause to the trial court for deter-
mination of the questions as to whether, with the findings a..CJ 
to the two prior convictions stricken out, probation should 
be granted or denied and whether the sentences, if to be 
reimposed, should run cumulatively or concurrently, it im-
pliedly and implicitly undertook to itself make those deter-
minations by ordering that "as so modified the judgment 
and order are affirmed." (People v. Bartges (1954), supra, 
128 Cal.App.2d 496, 497-498.) 
[2] The sheriff then filed a supplemental return which 
shows that petitioner is held under a modified abstract of 
judgments which show only one prior conviction (of arson). 
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the judgments were 
incorrect and beyond the power of the superior court to 
make (and the District Conrt of Appeal to affirm) in deter-
mining that the two prior convictions last recited therein 
(the charges of which had been dismissed) are true, has 
) 
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become moot in that he has secured the relief in that respect 
to which he was entitled. 
Petitioner still complains, however, that the trial court 
must be understood to have been influenced to some extent 
in ordering that the sentences run consecutively by its 
mistaken belief that he had suffered three prior convictions 
of crimes which, if committed in California, would have 
amounted to felonies, and that the issue on this matter is 
not moot. The record and the law support petitioner in this 
contention. [3] As this court has previously held, it cannot. 
be said that the trial court's unwarranted determination as 
to the number of prior convictions of felony did not influence 
it in sentencing petitioner to consecutive rather than con-
current terms. (People v. Morton (1953).41 Ca1.2d 536. 545 
[261 P.2d 523].) Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, the 
District Court of Appeal in disposing of certain of peti-
tioner's contentions adversely to him specifically relied upon 
the mistaken" assumption that petitioner "was shown to have 
been oonvicted of at least three prior felonies JI (p. 776 of 
126 Cal.App.2d). [4] The right of petitioner to have the 
trial court determine upon the corrected record whether pro-
bation shall be granted or denied and whet.her the sentences. 
if reimposed, shall run cumulatively or concurrently is a 
substantial one. Inasmuch as the statutes (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1203; 669; see also id., §§ 1213; 1213.5; 3021; 3024; 3024.5; 
3043) vest the power to make such determinations in the 
trial court and as the District Court of Appeal was acting 
only as a reviewing court, we conclude that the latter court 
exceeded its power and that the writ should issue for the 
purposes hereinafter specified. 
As indicated above, the petition for habeas corpus raises 
the further contention that petitioner was denied a fair trial 
in that the trial court refused to compel one Forrest Jameson 
to testify when called as a witness for petitioner. Jameson 
was jointly charged with petitioner with grand theft. His 
trial had been severed. He refused to testify on the ground 
that any evidence which he gave might tend to incriminate 
him. Petitioner presents no argument in this connection 
which would entitle him to relief on habeas corpus or which 
was not disposed of by the District Court of Appeal in 
People v. Bartges (1954), supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 763, 771-774. 
A question remains as to the form and substance of the 
order to be made in this case. [5,6] In construIng the 
meaning of the word "discharging" as used in section 1506 of 
= 
) 
248 IN BE BARTGES [44 C.2d 
the Penal Code l this court has recently noted that "The 
function of the writ of habeas corpus is solely to effect 'dis-
charge' from unlawful restraint, though the illegality in 
respect to which the discharge from restraint is sought may 
not go to the fact of continued detention but may be simply 
as to the circumstances under which the prisoner is held" 
and that he "may be discharged from illegal conditions of 
restraint although not from all restraint." (In re Ohess-
man (1955), ante, pp. 1, 5, 6 [279 P.2d 24] ; see a1so Pen. 
Code, § 1484 [" The court • • • must • • . dispose of such 
party [petitioner] as the justice of the case may require"] ; 
id., § 1493 ["In cases where any party is held under 
illegal restraint or custody . . . the . . . court may order such 
party to be committed to the restraint or custody of such 
person as is by law entitled thereto"] ; In re McOoy (1945), 
32 Ca1.2d 73, 77 [194 P.2d 531, 11 A.L.R.2d 934]; In re 
James (1952), 38 Ca1.2d 302, 313-314 [240 P.2d 596].) Upon 
initial consideration of the petition for the writ of habeas 
corpus we issued not the writ but an order to show cause 
why the relief prayed for should not be granted. The sheriff 
made his return to such order and the parties have stipulated 
that the petition for the writ shall be treated as a traverse 
to the return of the respondent sheriff. We also treat the 
return of the sheriff to the order to show cause as a return 
to the writ which is to be granted. [7] We have concluded 
that the writ should be granted, not to discharge the peti-
tioner from custody of the sheriff but to discharge him from 
only the illegal circumstances of his restraint which have 
been depicted above and to order his production before the 
superior court so that he may be dealt with according to 
law as a pl'rSOll properly cOllvicted of, but not yet properly 
sentcneed for, the substantive crimes charged in the informa-
tions in Los Angcl('s Superior Court criminal cases Number 
155767 and Number 155768 and the first, and only the 
first, prior cOllviction allegcd in each of the above numbered 
informations. 
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the petition for the 
writ of habeas corpus is granted and the petitioner is remanded 
to the custody of the sheriff of the county of Los Angeles 
to be brought before the superior court in that county to 
lSection 1506 provides that: ' 'An appeal may be taken . . • by the 
people from a final order of a superior court made upon the return of a 
writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in all 
criminal easea • • ." 
) 
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be dealt with according to law as a person validly and finally 
convicted of, but not since the modifications of the record 
as to prior convictions sentenced for, the substantive crimes 
charged in the informations in Los Angeles Superior Court 
criminal cases Number 155767 and Number 155768, and found 
to have been prevIously convicted of, and to have served a 
term in a state prison for, one, and only one, prior conviction 
of felony, to wit, arson, a felony (in Oregon), as alleged 
in the information in each of the above numbered cases. 
Upon production of the petitioner in the superior court 
as above ordered that court shall proceed to arraign him 
for judgment upon the record as amended by the order of 
the District Court of Appeal in People v. Barlges (1954), 
128 Cal.App.2d 496, 497-498 [275 P.2d 518]. Upon such 
arraignment the superior court will have power to consider, 
and "in its discretion to grant or deny, an application for 
11robation, if petitioner so requests, and will have power, and 
the duty if it determiues that judgments shall again be pro-
nounced, to direct whether the sentences shall run cumula-
tivelyor concurrently. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Petitioner was convicted of one count of forgery and one 
count of grand theft, and it was found in the judgment of 
conviction that he had suffered three prior felony convictions, 
although two of the three priors charged against him had 
been dismissed on motion of the district attorney before the 
case was submitted to the jury. Probation was denied, and 
it was ordered that the sentences on the primary counts should 
run consecutively. Petitioner appealed. The judgment was 
affirmed and became final. (People v. Badges, 126 Cal. 
App.2d 763 [273 P.2d 49]. No petition for hearing was 
filed in this court.) Petitioner then applied to this court for 
a writ of habeas corpus, and we issued an order to show 
cause why the writ should not issue. Thereafter, the District 
Court of Appeal was apprised of the fact that two of the 
three priors charged had been dismissed and on grounds of 
mistake it recalled the remittitur and modified the judgment 
of conviction by striking therefrom the finding that petitioner 
had suffered two of the three prior felony convictions. The 
judgment, as modified, was affirmed. (People v. Bartges, 
128 Cal.App.2d 496 [275 P.2d 518].) Thus, the judgment 
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no longer finds petitioner guilty of a charge not contained in 
the information. 
The controlling question in this habeas corpus proceeding 
is whether the District Court of Appeal acted in excess of its 
jurisdiction in affirming the judgment as modified rather 
than reversing it insofar as it imposed consecutive terms of 
imprisonment. Although the trial court, in denying peti-
tioner's application for probation and in sentencing him to 
consecutive terms on the primary offenses, might have been 
influenced by the mistaken belief that he "'ad suffered three 
prior felony convictions and although the District Court of 
Appeal ~ould have reversed the judgment with directions to 
l'e::;entence petitioner and to reconsider his application for 
probation in the light of the corrected judgment (see People v. 
Morton, 41 Ca1.2d 536, 545 [261 P.2d 523), I do not believe 
that if the District Court of Appeal erred in affirming the 
judgment as modified, its error was jurisdictional. 
It is not suggested that the claimed error in the present 
case raises any constitutional or other question of extraordi-
nary importance that would justify departure from the usual 
limitation that the writ of habeas corpus can be used only 
as a test of jurisdiction. (See In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 
492-495 [122 P.2d 22] ; In re Trombley, 31 Ca1.2d 801, 812 
[193 P.2d 734].) Thus, if a sentence is within the power 
of the trial court and the judgment is regular on its face, 
the fact that under the circumstances the sentence may be 
unduly severe cannot be inquired into by a writ of habeas 
corpus. (In re Marley, 29 Ca1.2d 525, 531 [175 P.2d 832] ; 
Ex Parte Miller, 89 Cal. 41, 42 [26 P. 620] ; In re Nicholson, 
24 Cal.App.2d 15, 16-17 [74 P.2d 288]; In re Azevedo, 42 
Cal.App. 662, 663 l183 P. 952] ; see also In re Pedrini, 33 
Cal.2d 876, 878 [206 P.2d 699}.) 
It is within the discretion of the trial court to direct that 
a defendant, who has been found guilty of the offense charged 
against him, be denied probation (Pen. Code, § 1203) and 
that he serve consecutive sentences (Pen. Code, § 669). The 
denial of probation and the imposition of consecutive sen-
tences on petitioner were therefore within the power of the 
trial court even though it might have erred in exercising its 
diseretion. On appl·al. tl}(~ District Court of Appeal had 
power to "reverse. amrm. or modify" the judgment. (Pen. 
Code, § 1260; People v. Craig. 17 Cal.2d 453. 458 [110 P.2d 
403].) It did modify anu affirm and, even if it erred in 
affirming mthcl' rhan rt'Yc!'sillg' with directions to resentence, 
it did not "exceed its power" in doing so. 
) 
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At most, the District Court of AppeaJ erred in applying 
the provisions of article VI, section 4%, of the California Con-
stitution by failing to reverse the judgment with directions 
to resentence petitioner and to reconsider his application 
for probation in the light of the corrected judgment. If 
the propriety of an appellate court's application of article 
VI, section 4%, can be questioned by a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, then a great number of this court '8 rulings 
on questions of prejudicial error will be subject to further 
review and the finality of criminal judgments will be seriously 
impaired. 
Moreover, at the time the District Court of Appeal recalled 
the remittitur,· the attorney general, in his "Suggestion of 
Grounds For Recall of Remittitur," raised the question of 
the propriety of modifying the judgment without reversing 
for reconsideration of petitioner's application for probation 
and resentencing on the basis of the judgment as modified. 
Counsel for petitioner was served with a copy of this docu-
ment, but made no reply, and failed to petition for a rehearing 
in the District Court of Appeal or to file a petition for hearing 
in this court after the District Court of Appeal had filed its 
opinion modifying and affirming the judgment of conviction. 
Petitioner has not offered any excuse for his failure to exhaust 
his remedies by way of appeal. "The general rule is that 
habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, 
and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an 
excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not 
lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, 
raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction. 
[Citations.] " (In re Dixon, 41 Ca1.2d 756, 759 [264 P.2d 
513] .) 
I would deny the writ. 
Edmonds, J'J and Spence, J'J concurred. 
-For the purposes of our decision in the present habeas corpus proceed-
ing, the fact that the District Court of Appeal recalled the remittitur 
Dnd modified the judgment has no more effect than if the judgment as 
thus modified had been entered originally. See In re Rothrock, 14 Cal.2d 
a4, a9 [92 P.2d 634]. 
